This week Asia-Pacific leaders are in Shenzhen for the annual APEC summit November 18–19. Donald Trump and Xi Jinping are set to meet again, but what makes their third meeting this year exceptional is the participation of Russia’s Vladimir Putin and a meeting of all three on Thursday. Cue dark visions of a Yalta 2.0 meeting of the big three who pay lip service to nuclear arms control while really bargaining over how they’ll carve up the world into revised spheres of influence.
Frankly, it’s unlikely that much will come of such a meeting beyond a megalothymic photo-op. It’s not 1945 and there’s no postwar settlement to build a new order on here. But it is likely to matter as a means for burnishing Xi’s credentials as an indispensable statesman and geopolitical convenor, and China as a risen, pivotal power. Expect the CCP’s Propaganda Department to milk the reputational afterglow for all it’s worth.
More interesting to observe will be how Chinese officials use APEC and its leader-level meetings to impose their strategic framework for managing and attenuating U.S. efforts to constrain the geopolitical ambitions of Xi and his Chinese Communist Party (CCP) — and by extension, Xi’s buddy Putin. Here, in a piece originally published in the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief and on its Substack, we assess what the PRC is doing and why. This version below adds some further analysis not available elsewhere.
For what’s on the table when Canada’s Mark Carney meets Xi Nov 17, see this post. For updates, check this Substack feed.
During Xi’s state visit to the U.S. in September 2026, he and Trump reinforced a framework of “constructive strategic stability.” Beijing wants to define the terms of this stability to constrain Washington’s policy by extracting American commitments to abstain from interference in its core interests. It remains to be seen whether the Trump administration accepts that framing as binding or treats it as a mere description of the current situation.
PRC officials tell Americans the relationship has stabilized to lull them into complacency, while warning their own people that the struggle must continue. At the White House, Xi said competition should be “a race in which each side tries to pull ahead, not a fight in which one side wins and the other loses” (你追我赶的赛跑,而不是你输我赢的角斗), an image that Chinese Ambassador to the United States Xie Feng later echoed. On November 2, Xie said China’s U.S. policy “has always maintained a high degree of stability and continuity” (始终保持高度的稳定性、连续性) and expressed hope that the two sides would “speed up turning the vision of the new positioning into action” (加快把新定位的愿景转化为行动).
The Trump administration had already largely dropped the competition framing from its own official descriptions of the relationship. Its 2025 National Security Strategy avoided the terms “great power competition” and “strategic competitor” to describe the PRC. Instead, the document pledges to “rebalance America’s economic relationship with China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness.” The White House used the phrase “constructive relationship of strategic stability” in its May 17 fact sheet and repeated it on Sep. 25, adding “respect,” granting Xi what he needs most as the core leader of a regime looking to burnish its legitimacy.
Beijing defines relations to limit U.S. action
Beijing is using its growing power to define the U.S.–PRC relationship for the first time. Chen Manyao of Renmin University’s Chongyang Institute noted that past positionings “were mostly proposed first by the United States, with China responding” (多由美方先提,中方予以回应). Similarly, commentator Zhang Sinan quoted political scientist E. E. Schattschneider, saying “the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power” (对选项的定义,是权力的最高工具). Marxist studies researcher Wang Peng characterized the Chinese initiative as one in which “you add the qualifier, and I supply the definition” (你加定语,我给定义).
The PRC’s ability to more proactively define the relationship and set the agenda rests on three factors. First is its successful exercise of leverage over the United States through its control over the rare earths supply chain; second is Trump’s interest in making deals; and third is a desire to capitalize on current conditions and lock in its preferred framing before the political weather in the United States changes. While both sides advocate for a relationship that is strategic, stable, constructive, and reciprocal, the Chinese side defines each of these terms in ways that do not necessarily align with U.S. understandings.
The CCP uses the term strategic (战略) to mean overall and long-term, and its ephemeral counterpart is tactical (战术). For example, Fudan University’s Wu Xinbo noted that the October 2025 Trump–Xi summit in Busan produced only an unsustainable and temporary “tactical stability” (战术性稳定), or truce. Strategic stability, by contrast, needs “major consensus on important issues” (在重要问题上形成重大共识) and a horizon of three years or more, a point Ambassador Xie reiterated in a signed article.
“Strategic stability” therefore operates at the same level as strategic competition, replacing it as the primary characterization of the relationship. Originally, the term emerged from the discourse surrounding nuclear arms control and was used by the United States to describe its relations with a peer competitor, the Soviet Union. In this context, “strategic” implies peer status, which Washington has long refused to grant Beijing. “Stability,” meanwhile, is understood differently today than during the Cold War. While superpower relations then rested on mutually assured destruction and, in Wu’s words, were “negative and non-constructive” (消极的、非建设性的), relations today are defined instead much more positively as “constructive.”
The historical basis of the phrase “constructive strategic stability” underscores the evolution of bilateral ties. It recycles two words from the 1997 landmark summit between then PRC leader Jiang Zemin and U.S. President Bill Clinton, during which the two leaders agreed to build a “constructive strategic partnership” (建设性战略伙伴关系). In Chinese, both formulations use “relationship” (关系), but the new version replaces “partner” (伙伴) with “stability” (稳定), signaling reduced ambitions and tacitly acknowledging that rivalry is structural.
Defining the relationship as “constructive” and “reciprocal” is meant to limit U.S. statecraft. Foreign Minister Wang Yi said in September that reciprocity is “sovereign equality” (主权平等), with “no distinction between higher and lower” (没有高低之分), and fairness is “not seeking unilateral absolute advantage” (不追求单方面的绝对优势). Under this view, U.S. export controls, allied coordination, and investment screening are “not constructive” and constitute unilateral breaches of agreed-upon “fairness.” Beijing can now argue that persistent competitive actions violate the two countries’ mutual understanding, pressuring Washington to make concessions; and given that Wang’s definition of “respect” covers each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, Beijing will likely use this to seek reduced U.S. support for Taiwan.
Beijing is already making that argument on trade. On Oct. 28, the Department of Homeland Security announced a ban on imports from three Chinese biotech firms on forced-labour grounds. The next day, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) said the listing “departs from the consensus reached by the two heads of state and seriously damages the stability of China–U.S. economic and trade relations” (背离两国元首达成的共识,严重破坏中美经贸关系稳定). After the Federal Communications Commission voted to stop recognizing testing laboratories in mainland China effective December 2028, MOFCOM accused the commission of “violating the important consensus reached by the two heads of state” (违背两国元首达成的重要共识) and said China had already “taken countermeasures in response” (前期已采取反制措施予以回应) to its earlier moves.
Beijing believes “struggle” produced a stalemate
Party-state officials acknowledge competition with the United States, but for domestic audiences frame it as concurrent struggle and stalemate. The Ministry of State Security (MSS) think tank China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), particularly under its former president Yuan Peng, has described competition as “a fairly long historical process” (相当长的历史过程) in which “periodic easing or tension will be the norm” (阶段性的缓和或紧张会是一种常态), and where “neither side can swallow the other” (谁也吃不掉谁). Yuan is reportedly now a vice-minister of state security under the name Yuan Yikun, which would lend direct MSS institutional weight to the perspective.
Chen Wenxin of CICIR’s Institute of American Studies more recently put forward the idea that the U.S.–PRC contest had by December 2025 entered a long and “comprehensive” stalemate (全面相持). Chen derives the term from the CCP’s doctrine of protracted war, in which stalemate precedes counter-offensive, but stresses that the U.S.–PRC stalemate is not a wartime one and that Mao’s three stages cannot be “mechanically applied” (机械套用) to it. A CICIR report released hours before Trump arrived in Beijing in May 2026 repeated the “comprehensive stalemate” framing.
For years, Xi has told Chinese officials to prepare for a long struggle, including against “external suppression and containment” (外部打压遏制), and to win it. In 2019 he told cadres that “the various struggles we face are not short-term but long-term” (我们面临的各种斗争不是短期的而是长期的), and a Politburo meeting he chaired in July 2020 concluded that on the economy “many of the problems we face are medium- to long-term and must be understood from the perspective of protracted war” (我们遇到的很多问题是中长期的,必须从持久战的角度加以认识). In 2023 he told Joe Biden that “it is unrealistic to try to change the other side” (想改变对方是不切实际的). In a Jan. 20, 2026 speech, Xi told cadres facing such pressure to “build up a solid reserve of strategies and measures … and strive to turn unfavorable factors into favorable conditions for defeating the enemy” (扎实储备谋略举措……努力把不利因素转化为克敌制胜的有利条件). Qiushi published the text two weeks before Trump’s May visit to China.
Scholars such as Renmin University’s Jin Canrong argue that the PRC has “won equality through strength” (用实力赢得了平等), laying a foundation for constructive strategic stability. The People’s Daily argues that the PRC’s readiness to fight the tariff war is what made a return to talks possible. Chinese scholars disagree, however, on how long the stalemate will last and what could mark its end.
The pause buys time to close gaps that Xi himself has conceded still remain, particularly in technology. For example, the PRC allocates roughly seven percent of research spending to basic research, compared with 15–20 percent in leading science powers. While some Western estimates suggest the PRC’s artificial intelligence capabilities lag those of the United States by 6.5 months, broader AI developments and critical subsectors may be further behind.
Beijing presses U.S. on Taiwan and trade
The CCP’s definitions of each aspect of the relationship framework are intended to give the Party-state a procedural lever to apply pressure over core issues. Beijing repeatedly insists that others respect its “four red lines” (四条红线), which Ambassador Xie adumbrated in May as “Taiwan, democracy and human rights, [the PRC’s development] path and [political] system, and [the] right to development” (台湾、民主人权、道路制度、发展权利) and reiterated in October.
Xi warns that mishandling the critical Taiwan issue could risk conflict, and both he and Wang Yi have applied pressure on Washington to actively oppose Taiwan independence rather than merely not endorsing it. Less than two weeks after the summit, the MFA’s spokesperson employed the “stability” lever to bolster China’s position on the “Taiwan issue.” Answering a Reuters question on Taiwan, the spokesperson said that “the U.S. side should implement the important consensus reached at the China–U.S. leaders’ meeting, abide by the one-China principle and the three China–U.S. joint communiqués, and handle the Taiwan question prudently” (美方应落实中美元首会晤重要共识,恪守一个中国原则和中美三个联合公报,慎重处理台湾问题).
On Oct. 29, the Ministry of National Defense pulled the same lever. Asked about reported plans to expand U.S.–Taiwan defense cooperation, it told Washington to “stop any form of official exchanges and military contact with China’s Taiwan region” and to “safeguard, with concrete actions, the stable, healthy, and sustainable development” of relations between the two countries and their militaries (停止与中国台湾地区开展任何形式的官方往来和军事联系,以实际行动维护两国两军关系稳定、健康、可持续发展).
Party-state commentators also insist Taiwan must not be treated as a “bargaining chip” (交易筹码) in bilateral ties, and officials call on Washington to abide by the August 17, 1982, U.S.–China Communiqué governing arms sales to Taipei. Ambassador Xie also claimed that the two presidents “agreed to jointly safeguard the victorious outcomes” of the Second World War (同意携手捍卫二战胜利成果), among which Beijing includes Taiwan’s “return” (回归) to China. The White House fact sheet records no such pledge.
The last of Beijing’s “four red lines” invokes a rights-based framing to curtail what it sees as hostile economic statecraft. It views U.S. tariffs, sanctions, and export controls as impeding the Chinese people’s right to development, which officials have long avowed “cannot be taken away” (不可剥夺). The stability frame limits foreign economic pressure by calling for a cap on measures that the United States and other countries consider necessary defenses against aggressive PRC mercantilism.
The Party is careful to leverage Trump’s perceived good relationship with Xi to promote predictability in bilateral relations, exculpating the U.S. president by warning that “some people” (某些人) are “complying in form while defying in substance” (阳奉阴违) with Trump’s own statements on Taiwan. This rhetorically insulates Trump from broader U.S. policy moves that Beijing disagrees with, leaving open pathways for Trump to make the concessions Beijing wants. On October 28, a Taiwanese reporter asked the Taiwan Affairs Office whether Trump’s recent criticism of Taiwanese chips for grabbing the U.S. market with low prices reflected Washington treating Taiwan as a tool for economic gain. The spokesperson’s answer did not mention Trump; it accused the Democratic Progressive Party authorities of selling out the island’s competitive industries “without principle or bottom line” (无原则、无底线) to “rely on the United States to seek independence” (倚美谋独).

One-sided stability
Although Xi in May 2026 tied the stability positioning to action, his regime has so far done little to translate this commitment into significant policy shifts. It has implemented limited measures to crack down on fentanyl precursors and agreed to import American coal in 2027 and 2028, in amounts that only the White House has quantified. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) air activity around Taiwan roughly halved year-on-year in the first half of 2026, returning to a previous baseline after reaching a historic peak in 2024–2025.
The eighth China–U.S. trade round, held Sep. 20–23, yielded various modest deliverables in areas including tariffs, agriculture, and AI. However, critical U.S. concerns such as rare earths again produced no Chinese commitment; Beijing did not confirm the White House account of its role in the Hormuz crisis; and it has rejected U.S. complaints of Chinese overcapacity.
There are also other pressure points in the relationship. Since Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s November 2025 comments that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan and thus potentially allow a response by Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, Beijing has sought to coerce and isolate Japan by repeatedly raising Japan’s wartime history, warning against a revival of Japan’s “militarism” (军国主义), and framing guarding against it as a shared responsibility. Beijing raised the China–U.S. alliance during the Second World War after Takaichi called Trump, and Xi at September’s state banquet said the Chinese and American peoples “fought side by side against Japanese militarist invaders” (并肩作战,抗击日本军国主义侵略者).
After the United States and Japan agreed to produce advanced air-to-air missiles in Japan, the PRC foreign ministry said on Oct. 29 that U.S.–Japan security cooperation “should not undermine regional peace and stability” (不应该破坏地区和平稳定) but reserved its fire for “the current Japanese government” (日本现政府), whose conduct it said the international community “must be highly vigilant against and resolutely stop” (国际社会必须高度警惕、坚决遏止). At the same time, China’s retaliatory export controls on Japan have also spilled over into U.S. supply chains, indirectly harming U.S. economic interests via a U.S. treaty ally.
The pattern of talking about stability while continuing coercion was also visible in the South China Sea, where Chinese ships on Sep. 24 obstructed Philippine vessels trying to resupply troops on Second Thomas Shoal, according to the Philippine Coast Guard. On September 27 the PLA’s Southern Theatre Command also held naval and air drills around Scarborough Shoal. After Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro warned that forcibly towing away the grounded BRP Sierra Madre would be an act of war, the Ministry of National Defence said Oct. 29 that the ship “should have been towed away long ago” (早就应该被拖走), adding that if Manila “repeatedly breaks faith and provokes” and lets “a few clowns run amok,” it “will inevitably push China–Philippines relations into a dangerous situation” (若一再失信挑衅,任由个别跳梁小丑肆意妄为,将不可避免地把中菲关系推向危险境地).
Xi’s negotiators have also sought to create an imbalance in the respective actions each side has agreed to. While the PRC has offered compromises on quantities of goods, licenses, or other measures, these measures are all easily reversible and often time-limited. Conversely, the concessions it demands from the U.S. side are far more complex to undo, such as “opposing” Taiwan independence and reconfiguring the U.S. alliance posture. This echoes the Party-state’s portrayal of its restraint as a choice made from geopolitical strength, and U.S. commitment to the framework as “the trustworthiness and sense of responsibility expected of a great power” (大国应有的言而有信与责任担当). Beijing apparently wants to limit the constraints of “strategic stability” to U.S.–PRC relations, rather than allowing them to restrict the PRC’s actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region. Asked on Oct. 29 about a U.S. warship’s passage near Sabina Shoal, the Ministry of National Defence said the United States “is not a party to the South China Sea issue” (美国不是南海问题的当事方) and “should immediately stop words and deeds that stir up trouble and provoke confrontation” (应立即停止搅局滋事、挑动对抗的言行).
Reflecting the increasingly controlled ideological climate Xi has imposed, the Party-state and its scholars blame nearly every risk on Washington, while almost no PRC analyst publicly names China’s own conduct.
Conclusion
Beijing is attempting to convert a tactical pause into a framework that constrains U.S. policy while maintaining PRC freedom of action. The stalemate doctrine treats this détente as a phase, and Chinese political scientist Zheng Yongnian describes its three-year duration as “tailor-made for President Trump” (给特朗普总统量身定制的).
The test for the Trump administration is whether it accepts the constructive strategic stability framework as a sincerely shared vision and interpretation of bilateral relations, or judges it by concrete actions rather than rhetoric alone. For U.S. allies, the critical question is whether “reciprocity” includes how Beijing treats them, too.










This is absolutely essential reading on China-US relations with implications for other nations.